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The debate about the relationship between economic growth and environmental sustainability 
involves many dimensions as well as much diversity in terminology. While it is often 
summarized in terms of dichotomous pro- and anti-growth positions, several studies indicate 
that additional views exist, and that these may differ between experts and the general public. 
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze segments of the scientific and general 
population with distinct views in this respect. To this end, we bring together two data sets: 
one from a nationally representative survey of the general public of Spain (N = 1,004) and 
another from an international survey of researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds (N 
= 814). Using latent class analysis, we identify three similar segments in the two samples, 
labelled as Green growth, Agrowth and Degrowth. Clusters in scientific opinion 
systematically differ on all main questions, while clusters in public opinion differ only on 
some issues. Overall, clusters are more consistent, better distinguishable on all constituent 
dimensions and more polarized in the scientific than public opinion survey. In addition, we 
find that diverging views on social issues are more strongly associated with distinct clusters in 
the public opinion sample, and on environmental issues in the scientific opinion sample.  
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Various indications suggest that opinions about the relationship between economic growth 
and environmental sustainability remain divided. An increasing number of studies indicate 
that growth is not compatible with environmental goals such as climate change mitigation 
(e.g. Jackson, 2009; Ward et al., 2016). In fact, around 15,000 scientists recently signed a call 
for humanity to end environmental destruction, which among other things asked to “reassess 
the role of an economy rooted in growth” (Ripple et al., 2017). Furthermore, although it does 
not yet translate in much parliamentary debate, there is evidence that politicians from left to 
right see the need to discuss alternative concepts of growth (Rivera, 2017). In addition, public 
opinion research indicates that more people prioritize environmental protection over 
economic growth in many European countries (Drews et al., 2018). These indications show 
that both scientists and the general public are involved in the debate. Hence, it is relevant to 
examine to what extent opinions about growth-versus-environment are similar or different 
between these two populations.  
An emerging literature is concerned with understanding public perceptions and attitudes 
related to this debate. A central research aim is to identify groups in the population that hold 
distinct views about this issue. The simplest form of grouping is dichotomous, that is, two 
groups with pro- and anti-growth views. Large-scale surveys such as the World Values 
Survey or the US Gallup poll capture views on growth-versus-environment by asking a 
single-item question framed in this way. However, such dichotomization is likely to hide 
heterogeneity (Kaplowitz et al., 2013; de Mooij and van den Bergh, 2002). Recent 
assessments of the growth-versus-environment debate have identified three main positions: 
“green growth”, “agrowth” and “degrowth” (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012). Further 
concepts and labels such as “sustainable growth”, “prosperity without growth”, “steady-state 
economy”, “beyond GDP” and “post-growth” demonstrate that the debate is not short of 




may be due to the growth debate touching upon many social and cultural issues, such as 
consumerism, inequality and well-being (Victor and Dolter, 2017).  
In any case, it remains unclear whether one can empirically identify a segmentation of 
opinions about growth-versus-environment that goes beyond the dichotomous pro-/anti-
growth framing. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how many segments of the 
population with distinct views exist, what size they are, and how they differ in terms of socio-
demographic and other characteristics. In particular, we are interested to capture opinion 
clusters by using questions on many dimensions of the growth debate, thus going beyond 
identifying opinions through single-item questions as in most previous studies based on, for 
example, the World Values Survey data set. 
To achieve this, we draw on clustering (or segmentation) analysis, which has been used 
extensively in research on environmental attitudes, notably regarding climate change (Hine et 
al. 2014). For example, a US study has identified six segments of the population with respect 
to climate change beliefs and behaviors, labeled as: “alarmed”, “concerned”, “cautious”, 
“disengaged”, “doubtful”, and “dismissive” (Maibach et al., 2011). These segments show 
distinct views, for example, regarding the expression of support for climate policies. 
However, such studies on climate change perception barely address the relationship with 
economic growth. A study by Poortinga and Darnton (2016) employed a more 
multidimensional approach which identified six segments of the population with regard to 
sustainability: “enthusiasts”, “pragmatists”, “aspirers”, “community focused”, 
“commentators”, and “self-reliant”. While it was not the focus of the study, it also included 
two scales measuring views on growth. These indicate that members of some segments tend 
to prefer having continued growth and prioritizing the environment over growth at the same 
time (the “enthusiast”), others have negative views about continued growth and prefer 





With regard to opinion clusters on growth-versus-environment, we are only aware of two 
unpublished studies by Tomaselli (2017). The first is based on interviews in Canada exploring 
mental models about growth and ecological economics. It describes five models or clusters of 
opinions: “expansionist”, “hesitant”, “indifferent”, “green-leaning” and “concerned”. The 
expansionists believed in indefinite growth and were highly techno-optimistic; the hesitant 
were unsure or undecided about the existence of limits to growth; the indifferent, green-
leaning and concerned all believed in limits to growth, but had different reasonings for their 
beliefs. A follow-up study by the same author sought to identify these segments in a large 
Canadian sample (N = 1,001). It used 12 Likert items (e.g. “The negative consequences of 
economic growth are greater than its benefits”) in its analysis, which resulted in three clusters: 
41% held attitudes closer to an expansionist worldview (that is, they were optimistic about 
growth), 23% held attitudes closer to an ecological worldview (skeptical about indefinite 
growth and technology), and 36% were in-between these two segments (no strong opinions 
about any issue).  
It is worthwhile to mention two clustering studies which sampled from two distinct 
groups in society, notably environmental experts and activists. The first, by Illge and 
Schwarze (2009), surveyed 196 German-speaking economists and sustainability researchers, 
asking them 40 sustainability-related questions. They derive a two-cluster solution including 
“ecological economics” and “open-minded neoclassical environmental economics”. Yet, only 
2 out of 40 questions explicitly addressed economic growth, and these were not among the 
questions that contributed to a clear divide – compared to, for example, questions about 
human behavior or the degree of objectivity of science. The second study drew on 814 
participants of the 2014 Degrowth conference in Germany, which included academics as well 
as practitioners and activists, identified five different groups (Eversberg and Schmelzer 2018). 




justice reasons, the clusters demonstrate substantial diversity, such as regarding everyday 
environmental practices (e.g., flying, meat consumption) or party politics.  
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze segments of the population with 
distinct views regarding the growth-versus-environment debate, while testing whether these 
differ among experts and the general public. For this we use and bring together two data sets 
(Drews and van den Bergh, 2016/2017): the first is from a nationally representative survey of 
the general public of Spain (N = 1,008), while the second is from an international survey of 
researchers from various disciplinary backgrounds (N = 814). The sample of the scientific 
survey is distinct from the two previously mentioned ones in the sense that it covers a 
considerably broader range of academic disciplines (compared to Illge and Schwarze, 2009) 
and invited views from all growth-vs-environment positions (compared to only degrowth in 
Eversberg and Schmelzer, 2018). In this way, we not only conduct one of the first 
segmentation studies on growth-vs-environment, but also contribute to the literature 
comparing public and scientific opinion, such as on economic (e.g. Blendon et al. 1997; 
Sapienza and Zingales 2013) and climate issues (Moloney et al., 2014).  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Data  
The first data set comes from a survey of the general public of Spain that included 1,004 
respondents. It is representative of the general population of Spain in terms of age, gender, 
income, education and geographical regions. The data was collected in 2014 through an 
online survey. More details about the survey implementation can be found in Drews and van 
den Bergh (2016).  
The second data set is composed of 814 researchers from a wide range of self-identified 
academic backgrounds, including economic growth studies, general economics, 




environmental sciences. The data was collected through an international online survey in 
2015. Among those invited to participate in the survey were researchers who published 
articles on growth-versus-environment or who published in journals (e.g. ecological 
economics) relevant to the topic of interest. More details about the scientific opinion survey 
can be obtained from Drews and van den Bergh (2017). In line with these two data sets, we 
later use “Sci” and “Pub” to refer to clusters identified in the scientific and public surveys, 
respectively. 
 
2.2 Survey questions 
Both surveys included 16 questions in the form of statements pertaining to the debate on 
economic growth versus the environment, listed in Table 1. They had identical wordings and 
were both answered on 7-point Likert scales from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Our segmentation analysis is built on the answers to these 16 questions. In addition, note that 
respondents in both surveys were informed that the term “economic growth” in all survey 
questions was defined as GDP growth. 
 
Table 1. Main statements of both surveys serving as input to the cluster analysis  
Statement label Statement wording 
Life satisfaction Continued economic growth is essential for improving people’s life satisfaction. 
Public services Economic growth is necessary to finance public health and pension systems. 
Stability Without economic growth the economy will become less stable. 
Environmental protection Economic growth is necessary to finance environmental protection. 
Full employment Full employment can be achieved without economic growth. 
Good life A ‘good life’ without economic growth is possible. 
Energy rebound Energy savings due to technological advances are partly undone by further economic 
growth.  
Environmental damage Economic growth always harms the environment. 
Development space In view of limited natural resources, rich countries may have to give up their economic 
growth to assure that all poor people in the world can reach a fair standard of living. 
Techno-fix Technology can solve all environmental problems associated with economic growth. 
Recovery Future economic growth will recover and again be as high as in the past. 
Post-materialism Economic growth raises incomes which in turn make people care more about the 
environment. 
Excessive political attention Politicians are too concerned about economic growth. 
Income inequality Making the income distribution more equal should get a higher priority than economic 
growth.  
Flawed welfare measure The GDP is a flawed measure of social welfare. 





There is one minor difference between the designs of the two surveys. Whereas in the 
scientific opinion sample respondents could provide a non-response by clicking “no opinion” 
or not answering a question, in the public opinion survey there was no such option and 
respondents instead were forced to provide an answer. This difference explains a substantial 
number of missing observations in the scientific survey, regarding the 16 questions about the 
growth-vs-environment debate as well as other variables. In particular, out of 814 respondents 
143 have missing responses on one or more of the 16 questions. To make sure that dropping 
these observations does not bias our sample, we conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (with 
the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same distribution) and a Wilcox 
rank sum test (equivalent to the Mann-Whitney test, with the null hypothesis that the two 
distributions differ in terms of a location shift). The results demonstrate that we can neither 
reject the null hypotheses nor detect any difference between the two samples (see Table A1 in 
the Appendix). In Figure A1 and A2 in the Appendix we illustrate how the two samples 
compare in terms of the distributions over the 16 main questions from Table 1 and additional 
questions from Table 2. 
There are six additional variables that are nearly identical in both surveys. Three of them 
are related to economic growth and will be used in the analysis to characterize and validate 
the emerging clusters. Moreover, there are three socio-demographic variables that are 
comparable in both surveys, namely gender, age and political orientation. All question 
wordings and codings of these six additional variables can be found in Table 2. Note that for 
the few cases where question wordings or codings slightly differ between surveys, we indicate 












Table 2. Question wordings and codings of additional survey items 
Variable Wording and response options Coding  





Here are several positions on the relation between economic growth and the 
environment. Which of them is closest to your own opinion? Public policy in rich 
industrialized countries should… 
Position 1: …further pursue economic growth in spite of its environmental impacts 
Position 2: ...further pursue economic growth. There are many ways to make economic 
growth compatible with environmental sustainability 
Position 3: ...ignore economic growth as a policy aim, that is, be completely neutral 
about growth. This will amplify the policy spectrum to combine well-being and 
environmental sustainability goals 
Position 4: ...stop pursuing economic growth. Production and consumption need to be 
downscaled in an equitable way to achieve environmental sustainability. 
1 to 4 
Belief in end of 
growth 
Scientific opinion: Roughly speaking, when do you think economic growth in rich 
industrialized countries will permanently come to an end? 
Public opinion: Roughly speaking, when do you think economic growth in rich 
industrialized countries will come to an end? 
In less than 10 years; 10-25 years; 25-50 years;  50-100 years; more than 100 years; 
never 
0 (never) 






Scientific opinion: Which average annual rate of economic growth should governments 
of rich industrialized countries aim for in the next decade? 
Public opinion: What rate of economic growth should the government of a rich 






Public opinion: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale, where 1 means the left and 9 means the right? 
Scientific opinion: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right” (or “liberal” 
and “conservative” in the US). Where would you place yourself on the following scale? 
Pub: 1 (left) 
to 9 (right) 
Sci: 1 (very 
left) to 7 
(very right) 
Gender  - 0 (male) to 1 
(female) 
Age - Number in 
years 
 
2.3 Analytical strategy 
Methods of segmentation research aim to identify clusters of individuals with similar opinions 




group heterogeneity and largest between-group differences. Traditionally, clustering 
techniques are divided into two broad categories: hierarchical and non-hierarchical ones (Hine 
et al., 2014). Hierarchical clustering involves estimating a matrix of pairwise distances 
between observations according to some pre-specified distance metric (such as Manhattan or 
Euclidian distance), which allows the generation of a tree-based representation of the 
observations (a ‘dendrogram’). The clusters are then determined by its examination, balancing 
height of the fusion on the vertical axis, which serves as a proxy of the dissimilarity between 
observations, and the number of clusters. Non-hierarchical clustering requires a pre-specified 
number of clusters, and then allocates individuals in one of them. The most frequently used 
non-hierarchical methods are K-means and latent class analysis (LCA). K-means randomly 
allocates centroids (seeds) for the pre-specified (k) clusters and then assigns each individual to 
the closest centroid (cluster). Subsequently, one iteratively updates the values of the centroids 
by calculating means of the formed clusters. This continues until the algorithm converges, i.e. 
once the values of the centroids do not change further. 
In the last decade, interest has been rising in the application of another non-hierarchical 
method, namely LCA (see McCutcheon, 1987). It is known not only as a method of clustering 
observations, but as a modeling tool for accounting for heterogeneity in data (Vermunt and 
Magidson, 2004). LCA aims to uncover hidden clusters in data by grouping subjects from 
multivariate data into “latent classes”, i.e. groups with similar, unobservable, membership. It 
does so using model-based posterior membership probabilities estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimation. Among the advantages of LCA is the provision of a range of fitness 
indices (like information criteria) for determining which number of clusters best fits the data 
and a proven ability to recover true group structures where alternative clustering methods fail 
(Bacher et al., 2004).  
For this reason, we will use LCA from the “poLCA” package in R software (Linzer and 




3.1-3.2), while subsequently we compare the obtained clusters based on a composite index of 
growth skepticism and separately on all the relevant dimensions (Sections 3.3-3.4). This 
approach has the advantage of identifying differences between respondents of the two 
surveys. Instead, pooling the data and performing then a single cluster analysis would not 
allow us to identify distinct clusters within each population.  We will estimate the fitness of 
distinct numbers of clusters (from one to nine), and make a final decision based on 
performance in terms of information criteria that maximize model fit and penalize complexity 
(number of clusters). Since LCA is a stochastic method, we will restart the algorithm 50 times 
and run it for 3000 iterations, to ensure robustness of convergence and rule out local optima. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Scientific opinion clusters 
We start with defining the appropriate number of clusters. To do so, we consider three 
commonly used Information Criteria (ICs): consistent Akaike criterion (cAIC), Bayesion 
criterion (BIC) and adjusted BIC (aBIC). Two ICs (BIC and cAIC) suggest three clusters 
while the third one (aBIC) points towards 5 clusters (see Figure A3 in the Appendix). Taking 
into account that BIC has been recommended as the superior measure (Nylund et al., 2007), 
we decide to use three clusters. This also avoids a more complicated model (of five clusters) 
which is harder to interpret. Figure 1 shows the resulting three clusters and their distribution 
with respect to the 16 main questions. Here one can see that taking into account all the 
questions used, clusters clearly differ, which indicates that there are systematic differences 
between respondents. We continue by analyzing these differences seen in the visual 
presentations, but note that we also conducted tests indicating statistically significant 
differences (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
The Green growth Sci cluster (green, 31% of the sample) represents the researchers with 




development, that growth is needed for environmental protection and that it is not always 
harmful to the environment. In addition, they believe that growth is necessary to improve life 
satisfaction and do not agree that lowering inequality should be prioritized. 
The Degrowth Sci cluster (red, 25% of the sample) is antagonistic to Green growth Sci 
cluster, as these researchers have the most critical views about growth. Compared to the other 
clusters, the relation of growth to the environment is seen to be as skeptical, that is, growth is 
viewed as damaging the environment and is not considered to be necessary for protecting the 
environment. This cluster also strongly disagrees with the potential of technology to solve 
environmental problems. Furthermore, it disagrees strongly with the idea that growth is 
needed to improve life satisfaction and believes that a good life is possible without growth. 
Finally, these researchers strongly believe in the limits of development space and that 
lowering inequality should be prioritized over growth. 
The Agrowth Sci cluster (blue, 44% of the sample) is in-between the two previous ones. 
While on some issues this cluster is closer to Green growth Sci cluster (namely on opinions 
regarding development space, energy rebound, excessive political attention and governmental 
control), on others it is closer to Degrowth Sci cluster (opinions on environmental damage of 
growth, stability, recovery, public services, good life). On certain issues, namely skepticism 
regarding whether growth is needed for environmental protection, full employment, life 







Figure 1. Distribution of responses on the 16 questions regarding growth-vs-environment 
debate among the three clusters in the scientific opinion survey.  
Note: Responses on the Y-axis range from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
 
In Figure 2 we can observe how the clusters relate to the three additional variables about 
growth (complete question wordings are in Table 2). It is noteworthy that the clusters are 
associated to the preferred growth-environment strategies  in a way one might expect based 
on the literature (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012). In particular, we find that the Green 
growth Sci cluster prefers a public policy that combines economic growth and environmental 




second graph in Figure 2). The Agrowth Sci cluster prefers a public policy that ignores 
economic growth as an objective, making it easier to combine well-being and sustainability 
(value “3”). The Degrowth Sci cluster prefers a public policy that has the goal of stopping 
economic growth, meaning a reduction of production and consumption in order to achieve 
sustainability (value “4”). This result can be seen as a validation of the clustering exercise, as 
these preferences may capture the essence of each cluster. This result also serves as a 
justification for the labels used to describe the three clusters in scientific opinion and 
subsequently in public opinion. In addition, the results show that the Green growth Sci cluster 
tends to show a belief in never-ending growth (value “0” in the first graph of Figure 3), 
whereas the Agrowth Sci and Degrowth Sci clusters think that growth will come to an end at 
some point in the future (value “1”). Moreover, the favored growth rate in rich countries 
decreases steadily from Green growth Sci to Degrowth Sci (graph 3 in Figure 2). These 
tendencies are confirmed by the multinomial regression analysis shown in Table 3, which 
includes age, gender and political orientation in addition to the three variables about growth. 
 
 
Figure 2. Relating the three scientific clusters to additional variables regarding growth. 





Table 3. Multinomial logit regression analysis of cluster membership and additional survey 
variables 
 Scientific opinion  Public opinion 
 
Green Growth  Degrowth   Green growth  Degrowth  Indifferent  
Age -0.007 0.026  0.023*** -0.006 -0.048*** 
 
(0.014) (0.023)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) 
Gender 0.238 -0.432  -0.349** -0.866*** 0.714** 
 





-0.053 -0.290*** 0.042 
 (0.141) (0.340)  (0.043) (0.061) (0.066) 




-0.698*** -0.387 -0.583* 
 






-0.274** 0.635*** 0.106 
 





0.034 -0.295*** 0.108 
 (0.122) (0.364)  (0.048) (0.056) (0.074) 
Constant 2.664* -2.708  0.042 0.380 -0.833 
 
(1.377) (1.959)  (0.538) (0.627) (0.832) 
     
Akaike Inf. Crit. 326.067 326.067  1,949.082 1,949.082 1,949.082 
Note: Agrowth is the reference group in scientific and public opinion. P-values: *p<0.1; 
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 
3.2 Public opinion clusters 
Now we apply the same sequence of steps to the public opinion survey available. One of the 
first important findings here is that cAIC and BIC indicate that the optimal number of clusters 
is not three (like for scientific survey) but four (see Figure A4 in the Appendix). We proceed 
using this number of clusters. 
We consider the distribution of responses with respect to the 16 questions regarding the 
growth-vs-environment debate used for clustering, as shown in Figure 3. In contrast to the 




reflected by the same median response, and sometimes even further moments (quantiles). The 
clearest examples are opinions on energy rebound, environmental damage, and governmental 
control, and to a lesser degree also development space, flawed welfare measure and techno 
fix. This may indicate the fact that respondents have strong differences in opinion only on few 
issues, such as life satisfaction and good life. This raises some doubts about the labelling of 
the clusters. However, as we see similarity with patterns in scientific opinion, we use the same 







Figure 3. Distribution of responses on the 16 questions regarding the growth-vs-environment 
debate among the four clusters in the public opinion survey. 
Note: Responses on the Y-axis range from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
 
The Indifferent Pub cluster (yellow, 10% of the sample) shows, consistent with its label, 
surprisingly little variation: over 99% of responses have the same value (“4” – neither 
disagree nor agree) for 14 out of 16 questions. This may indicate that people are indifferent, 




survey did not have a non-response option, these people might have chosen to not respond if 
this option had been available. It is impossible here to give a conclusive answer as to the 
underlying motivation of these responses. We decide to keep this cluster as it may otherwise 
lead to a misrepresentation of public opinion.  
The Green growth Pub cluster (green, 29% of the total sample) shows overall the most 
positive views about growth. For example, people in this cluster agree most to the statements 
that growth is necessary to improve life satisfaction and to finance environmental protection, 
and they disagree most with the ideas that “a good life is possible without growth” or the 
excessive political attention given to growth. 
The Degrowth Pub cluster (magenta, 18% of the sample) has overall the most negative 
views about growth. Compared to the other clusters, it reflects agreement with the idea of a 
good life without growth, that growth is given excessive political attention, and that full 
employment is possible without growth. It also indicates disagreement with growth being 
necessary for life satisfaction, environmental protection, economic stability and public 
services. Compared to the other clusters, it disagrees that people will become more 
environmentally concerned with rising incomes (post-materialism) and that environmental 
problems can be fixed with technology. 
The Agrowth Pub cluster (turquoise, 43% of the sample) falls between the Green growth 
Pub and Degrowth Pub clusters on some questions, such as about the good life. However, 
overall one can observe that on several issues people in this cluster tend to be more similar to 
the Green growth Pub than to the Degrowth Pub cluster (environmental protection, excessive 
political attention, full employment, public services, post-materialism, economic stability).  
Figure 4 shows how clusters are associated with further survey questions about growth. 
With respect to the growth-environment strategy, we find that the Degrowth Pub cluster 
prefers ignoring (but not stopping) economic growth (value “3” in the second graph of Figure 




sustainability (value “2”). These results are less consistent compared with the scientific 
opinion survey. However, when we consider the inter-quartile ranges, we see the Agrowth and 
Degrowth Pub clusters extend to ignoring (value 3) and stopping (4) growth, respectively. 
Moreover, Degrowth Pub has a lower (but not a zero) desired growth rate for rich countries. 
There are no differences in terms of beliefs about an end to economic growth in the future. 
 
Figure 4. Relating the three public clusters to additional variables regarding growth.  
 
3.3 Comparing clusters in the two surveys using a growth skepticism index 
The next step of the analysis is to bring together the two surveys and compare the clusters that 
appear similar (e.g. Green growth clusters in public and scientific opinion). We construct a 
composite index that represents low or high ‘growth skepticism’ expressed by the survey 
respondents. To this end, we considered agreement with items expressing a pro or anti-growth 
position. Some items had to be recoded (e.g. “Economic growth is necessary to finance 
environmental protection.”) so that disagreement means high growth skepticism. The sum of 
all items were divided by the total number of items, resulting in a composite index that is also 
bound between 1 and 7, where larger values imply higher degrees of growth skepticism. We 
then compare clusters of both surveys how they score on this composite indicator, which is 
shown in Figure 5. The X-axis represents the composite indicator, while the color of the 




by the government” was coded so that agreement with the statement is counted as expressing 
growth skepticism. This is a debatable choice and we therefore also considered a reverse 
coding, as illustrated by the white spheres in Figure 5. 
A notable finding, apart from a much larger overall spread between the clusters in 
scientific opinion compared to public opinion, is that the Agrowth Pub cluster is closer to the 
Green growth Pub cluster, but not to its counterpart, that is, the Agrowth Sci cluster. Overall, 
these results suggest more diversity of opinion in the survey of scientists. The general public 
tends to be less skeptical about growth, with three clusters (on average) slightly below the 
average of the composite score. Nevertheless, these results should be analyzed in more detail 












Figure 5. Clusters in public and scientific opinion survey viewed according to their average 
composite index of ‘growth skepticism’. 
Note: The size of a sphere represents the size of the associated cluster. The upper three spheres 
represent scientific opinion and the lower four - public opinion. If we consider the ‘Governmental 
control’ variable to have the opposite interpretation (not anti- but pro-growth), the positioning of the 
clusters would slightly change, as reflected by the white spheres. One can see that the positioning of 
public opinion clusters is more sensitive to interpretation of this variable. In the scientific opinion only 
the degrowth cluster moves slightly to the left.  
 
 
3.4 Comparing similar clusters between the two surveys on all questions 
A final step in the analysis is to compare the clusters of the two surveys on all survey items. 
Given that the Indifferent Pub cluster in public opinion is relatively small and lacks an 
equivalent cluster in scientific opinion, we decided to drop it from this part of the analysis. 
We will discuss a visual analysis presented in Figure 6, but note that formal statistical tests 




represented by the dark green (public opinion) and light green (scientific opinion) boxplots in 
Figure 6 have similar opinions on environmental protection, flawed welfare measure, full 
employment, life satisfaction, stability and techno fix. The scientists and the general public 
have diverging views on some environmental statements, such as development space and 
environmental damage, indicating that Green growth Sci is less concerned about 
environmental limits and damages of growth. The two clusters furthermore are at least two 
scale points apart on items like good life (scientists are undecided, public disagrees), income 
inequality (public agrees) and post-materialism (scientists agree). In sum, the Green growth 
Pub cluster seems to be more associated with social and economic arguments in favour of 
growth, while Green growth Sci are more convinced about the compatibility of growth and 
environment. 
How do the Agrowth clusters compare? We continue analyzing Figure 6, where blue 
represents public opinion and turquoise represents scientific opinion. Both clusters are similar 
in terms of opinion on income inequality, post-materialism and recovery. They are at least 
two scale points apart on environmental protection (public agrees, scientists disagree), 
excessive political attention (scientists agree), full employment (scientists agree, public 
disagree), good life (scientists agree), life satisfaction (scientists disagree, public agree) and 
techno fix (scientists disagree). Taken together, these results suggest that the Agrowth Sci 
cluster is overall more critical about growth, in particular regarding the technological potential 
to address environmental problems (note that scientists also somewhat agree with rebound). 
The Agrowth Pub cluster, in contrast is more optimistic regarding technological potential and 
questions the argument that good social welfare outcomes (e.g. full employment) can be 
achieved without growth.  
Next, we examine the two Degrowth clusters, which are represented by the colours red 
(public opinion) and magenta (scientific opinion). They are similar on the issues of 




inequality, public services, recovery and stability. They differ in terms of development space 
(scientists agree more than the public), energy rebound (scientists completely agree, while 
public opinion expresses no clear preference), environmental protection (scientists more 
strongly support the argument that growth is not necessary for protection of the environment), 
and techno fix (scientists disagree that technologies can solve all environmental problems). In 
addition, it is noteworthy that scientists are very clear that life satisfaction does not depend on 
growth, whereas opinions are more spread in the public cluster. One may conclude that both 
groups are skeptical about growth, but the scientists in this cluster are considerably more 






Figure 6. Comparing clusters across the scientific and public opinion surveys. 
Note: Responses on the Y-axis range from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). 
 
We further analyze how the clusters relate to additional variables that are present in both 
surveys, as shown in Figure 7. Three specific variables are of interest, capturing beliefs and 
preferences regarding economic growth: belief in an end of growth in the future, a preferred 




three socio-demographic variables: age, gender and political orientation). As mentioned 
before, most noteworthy is that the scientific clusters relate more consistently to the additional 
variables about growth. For example, while the Degrowth Pub cluster has a preferred growth 
rate of around 2.5%, the Degrowth Sci cluster lies around 0%. With respect to the three 
sociodemographic variables, it is noteworthy that both Degrowth clusters were – compared to 
the Agrowth clusters – significantly more likely to be associated with more left-wing political 
orientation (Table 2). In addition, Green growth Sci, but not Green growth Pub, was 
significantly associated with more political right-wing orientation. 
 
 
Figure 7. Comparing clusters across the scientific and public opinion surveys regarding the 
additional variables about growth.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper had the objective to identify and analyze opinion clusters in two surveys of public 
and scientific opinions in the debate on growth-versus-environment. This delivers four key 
findings. First, we find three opinion clusters in scientific opinion, which we labeled as Green 
growth, Agrowth and Degrowth. In public opinion, we find three clusters that are comparable 




we interpret as a group of people who are undecided or indifferent about growth/environment. 
Second, clusters in the scientific opinion survey are systematically different on almost all 
main questions related to the growth-versus-environment debate, whereas in the public 
opinion survey such differences only apply to some questions. Third, the scientific opinion 
clusters are more consistently related to additional questions about growth. Most notably, the 
Green growth Sci cluster favours continuing with economic growth, the Agrowth Sci cluster 
favours ignoring it, while the Degrowth Sci cluster favours stopping it. Such consistent 
preferences could not be identified in public opinion, although the overall tendencies are 
similar. Fourth, when comparing clusters of both surveys on a composite score of growth 
skepticism, one sees that the clusters in the scientific opinion lie further apart, indicating 
stronger polarization compared to the public sample. That is, the Degrowth Sci cluster is 
considerably more skeptical about growth compared to Degrowth Pub cluster.  
Overall, our results are somewhat consistent with a study for Canada (Tomaselli, 2017) 
which found that 41% of the study participants held pro-growth worldview, 23% held a pro-
environment worldview (skepticism about indefinite growth and technology), and 36% were 
in-between these two segments (no strong opinions about any issue). In our public opinion 
survey, the Green growth segment is also larger than the Degrowth one. The segments that are 
in-between these two groups, though, are even larger in our sample. In other words, it is only 
minorities that have relatively clear and consistent views on the growth-environment 
relationship, while a majority is undecided and emphasizes distinct issues. In any case, the 
important contribution of this study is to identify distinct clusters in the growth-versus-
environment debate, whereas the exact percentage of each of these is likely to differ across 
cultural contexts, as indicated by more general cross-country comparisons of environmental 
perceptions (e.g. Brechin and Bhandari, 2011). 
The higher consistency and polarization among scientists compared to the general public 




Researchers are likely to be more personally involved in the issue and consider it more 
important, having, thus, more accessible memory of the relevant concepts and showing 
stronger emotions related to them. These factors cause attitudes to be more ‘crystallized’, 
indicating consistency and polarization. The latter imply that public opinion may be 
considerably less stable and can be more easily influenced, for instance, through 
communication.  
In terms of policy, our findings suggest that a considerable part of the population exhibits 
skeptical views about growth. This evidence contradicts the common assumption of 
unequivocal public support for economic growth (Buch-Hansen, 2018) and is good news for 
policymakers who are critical of growth on a personal rather than party level (Rivera, 2017). 
It is, of course, debatable whether the Degrowth Pub cluster deserves its name, as it does not 
show such a consistent and intense opposition to growth compared to the scientific cluster. 
“Growth skeptics” could be a suitable alternative. But the choice of labels is difficult in any 
segmentation study. We think that the labels used here are generally meaningful as well as 
consistent with recent academic and public debates (e.g., van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012, 
Jakob and Edenhofer, 2012).  
Several research implications follow from our findings. First, public opinion studies 
capturing views on growth/environment through single-item questions are recommended to 
use three (Green growth, Agrowth and Degrowth) instead of two (pro-growth/pro-
environment) response options, confirming suggestions by earlier studies (Kaplowitz et al., 
2013; Drews and van den Bergh, 2016). Next, future research could try to validate the present 
findings, notably whether segments differ in socio-demographic, attitudinal or behavioral 
respects, or whether or not the same or similar segments are found in distinct cultural 
contexts. A final suggestion is to employ the developed clusters to study the role of public 
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Mean in the 
sample of 
missings 







Environmental protection 131 3.98 3.84 0.81 0.49 
Income inequality 134 5.42 5.26 0.68 0.40  
Life satisfaction 132 3.66 3.79 0.98 0.44  
Development space 132 4.28 4.41 0.99 0.47  
Techno fix 134 2.87 2.71 0.97 0.38  
Excessive polit attention 131 5.28 5.36 1.00 0.77  
Post materialism 134 4.07 4.08 0.86 0.93  
Flawed welfare measure 129 5.60 5.69 1.00 0.66  
Stability 125 4.43 4.35 0.86 0.58  
Environmental damage 137 3.33 3.30 1.00 0.97  
Recovery 92 3.88 3.64 0.48 0.11  
Full employment 111 4.20 4.11 0.86 0.59  
Public services 128 4.38 4.35 1.00 0.74  
Energy rebound 112 5.57 5.47 0.96 0.27  
Governmental control 122 4.17 4.14 0.80 0.67  
Good life 125 5.30 5.27 1.00 0.70  
Belief end of growth 92 0.54 0.57 1.00 0.70  
Growth environ strategy 124 2.70 2.71 1.00 0.80  
Political orientation 131 3.01 2.97 1.00 0.64  
Gender 140 0.29 0.24 0.90 0.19  
Age 137 44.28 45.37 0.29 0.27  
Growth rate 69 1.57 1.59 0.98 0.73 
 
 
Table A2. Comparisons of cluster within and between surveys 
 
 Scientific opionion 
survey 
 Public opinion survey  Pairwise comparison 
between surveys 




16 main questions 
              
Development.space               
Energy.rebound 
              
Environmental.damage 
              
Environmental.protection 
              
Excessive.polit.attention 
              
Flawed.welfare.measure 
              
Full.employment 
              
Good.life 
              
Governmental.control 
              
Income.inequality 
              
Life.satisfaction 
              
Post.Materialism 
              
Public.services 
              
Recovery 
              
Stability 
              
Techno.fix               
Additional variables               
Age               
Belief.end.of.growth               
Gender               
Growth.environ.strategy               
Growth.rate               
Political.orientation 
              
Note: in the table results of the Krushkal-Wallis rank sum test with bonferroni correction of p-values at the 1% significance 
value are presented. If the two clusters are significantly different according to the test, the entry has a dark shading, while if 
the two clusters are not significantly different on the variable of interest, the entry has light shading. The left block of the 
column presents results for clusters generated in the scientific opinion survey, the mid block - for clusters in the public 
opinion survey, while the right block compares clusters with seemingly similar attitude between the two surveys. 1=Green 






Figure A1. Distribution of observations with missings compared to those without missings 







Figure A2. Distribution of observations with missings compared to those without missings 


















Figure A5. Relating clusters of the scientific and public opinion surveys to the 
sociodemographic characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
